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Access to environmental information held by the European Union Institutions. A critical 
examination of the relationship between the Aarhus Convention, Regulation 1049/2001/EC 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents and 
Regulation 1367/2006/EC on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention  on Access 
to Information, Public Participation in Decisions-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters to Community Institutions and bodies 
 
Susan Wolf 
 
Introduction 
On 25 June 1998 the European Community,
1
 along with 35 states (including most of the current 28 
Member States of the European Union) signed the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.
2
  The Aarhus 
Convention, typical of many international agreements which are concluded jointly by the EU and its 
Member States, binds both the Union institutions and each of the Member States.
3
 The Member 
States are bound by the Convention in their own rights, and as a matter of EU law, through their 
membership of the EU and the legal instruments adopted by the EU in fulfilment of its Convention 
obligations.
4
 This papeƌ eǆaŵiŶes the ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ the EU͛s AĐĐess to DoĐuŵeŶts 
Regulation
5
 and the Aarhus Regulation
6
and the extent to which the combined provisions succeed in 
aligning Union law with the access to environmental information provisions of the Convention. The  
focus of the examination will be on the exceptions to disclosure of information and the differences 
between the Convention and the EU legislation will be analysed. It will be argued that that not only 
does the EU legislation lack coherence and clarity but also that the combined provisions breach the 
Convention in a number of key respects.  The General Court has already ruled that Article 10 (1) of 
the Aarhus Regulation
7
 is not compatible with Article 9(3) of the Convention (although this is subject 
                                                          
1
 The European Union replaces and succeeds the European Community by Article 1 Treaty on European Union. 
2
 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (1998). There are now 46 parties  to the Convention.  
3
 ‘efeƌƌed to as ͚ŵiǆitǇ͛. Foƌt fuƌtheƌ disĐussioŶ see A ‘osas ͚The EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ aŶd Miǆed AgƌeeŵeŶts͛ iŶ A 
Dashwood & C Hillion (eds) The General Law of EC External Relations (2000) Sweet & Maxwell 
4
 Article 216 (2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that agreements concluded 
by the EU are binding on the institutions of the EU and the Member States. 
5
 Regulation 1049/2001/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents OJL 145/43  31.5.2001 
6
 Regulation 1367/2006/EC  of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the 
application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community Institutions and Bodies OJL 
264/13  25.9.2006 
 
7
  Case T 396/09 Vereniging Milieudefensie &  Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v Commission at 
paragraph 69 (not yet published); and  T-338/08 Stichting Natuur enCouncil Milieu & Pesticide Action Network 
Europe (not yet published). 
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to appeal) and a number of further cases are pending before the General Court in which applicants 
have sought to rely directly on the Convention to challenge decisions refusing access to 
environmental information. However, this paper will argue that even if applicants are successful in 
these arguments EU law fails to provide applicants with an effective judicial remedy as required by 
Article 9 of the Convention.  
The Aarhus Convention 
Described as "the most ambitious venture in environmental democracy undertaken under the 
auspiĐes of the UŶited NatioŶs" the Aaƌhus CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s ideologiĐal ďase is that eǀeƌǇ peƌsoŶ has a 
right to live in an environment adequate to his health and wellbeing.
8
 Pragmatically the Convention 
does not seek to guarantee such a right, rather its focus is on the conferral of  certain procedural 
rights which will enable individuals and their associations to protect and improve the environment 
for the benefit of present and future generations. 
9
  Echoing the values enumerated in Principle 10 of 
the Rio Declaration,
10
 the Convention asserts that freedom of information about the environment is 
a necessary precondition for the public to participate in policy and decision making relating to the 
environment. Moreover the Convention includes important provisions on access to justice which, 
inter alia, allow the public to enforce their rights under the Convention. These procedural rights are 
enshrined in the three pillars of the Convention.  The first pillar (Articles 4 & 5) is concerned with 
access to environmental information and is the focus of this paper. The second pillar (Articles 6-8) 
provides for public participation in environmental decision making.
11
 The link between the two 
pillars is self-evident; in order for there to be meaningful participation in decision making the public 
must have access to the environmental information held by public authorities, particularly those 
public authorities charged with  environmental decision making. It is important to emphasise this 
because in practice a delay in providing information in a timely fashion can potentially prejudice the 
informed involvement of the public in environmental decision making where representations and 
views need to be submitted within tight deadlines.
12
  The third pillar (Article 9) requires the 
Convention parties to ensure that effective administrative and judicial mechanisms are in place so 
that the rights conferred by the Convention are protected and the law is enforced. More particularly 
Article 9 (1) specifies the access to justice requirements relating to access to environmental 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
    
 
8
 Kofi A Anna, Secretary General of the United Nations, 1997-2006 at 
http://aarhusclearinghouse.unece.org/about/ (accessed 12
th
 August 2013) 
9
 Note 2, Recital 7  
10
 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992 (United Nations) 
11
 Articles 6-8 provide that the public has a right to participate in certain decisions in relation to activities 
(projects) that are likely to have significant effect on the environment; plans, programmes and policies relating 
to the environment; and during the preparation of executive regulations and/or generally applicable legally 
binding normative instruments. 
12
 See for example, Case T-449/10, ClientEarth, European Federation for Transport and Environment (T&E), 
European Environmental Bureau (EEB), and BirdLife International v European Commission (not yet published). 
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information but must be read in conjunction with Article 9 (4) which imposes a number of important 
overriding conditions.
13
 
 
Implementing measures  
Prior to the conclusion of the Convention in February 2005  the EU institutions were not legally 
obliged to comply with the access to environmental provisions of the Convention.
 14
  this much was 
confirmed by the Court of First Instance in  Case T-264/04 WWF European Policy Programme v 
Council. 
15
.  The case involved a refusal by the Council to  disclose documents containing 
environmental information but the Court of First Instance was not persuaded by arguments relating 
to the applicability  of the Convention since at the time of the refusal neither the Aarhus Convention 
nor the Aarhus Regulation, which purported to implement the Convention, was in force.    The 
existing legislation, at the time of this decision, was Regulation EC/1049/2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (hereafter the ATD Regulation), 
16
which had entered into force in December 2001. It therefore post-dated the EU͛s sigŶature to the 
Convention but predated its conclusion. In short the ATD did not purport to give effect to the 
obligations laid down in the Convention. On the one hand its reach went well beyond documents 
containing environmental information; on the other it only applied to documents held by the 
Parliament, Council and Commission and the exceptions to disclosure were not based on the Aarhus 
Convention. 
17
   However, access to documents held by other institutions and agencies was governed 
by institutional specific Decisions which largely mirrored the ATD Regulation. 
18
  
 
Although the obligation to comply with the requirements of an International agreement arises only 
on conclusion of such agreement, it has been claimed that there is no need for any particular act of 
transposition; it being sufficient that the agreement is concluded by the Council. 
19
 It is therefore 
arguable that there was no need for any new legislation to comply with the first pillar, particularly 
since Article 2 (6) of the ATD Regulation included a play safe clause (commonly known as the Aarhus 
clause) which provided that ͞This ‘egulatioŶ shall ďe ǁithout pƌejudiĐe to ƌights of puďliĐ aĐĐess to 
documents held by the institutions which might follow from instruments of international law or acts 
of the iŶstitutioŶs iŵpleŵeŶtiŶg theŵ.͟   Hoǁeǀeƌ, iƌƌespeĐtiǀe of the possiďilitǇ that aŶ 
international agreement is self-executing in EU law, the majority of international agreements 
                                                          
13
 The procedures laid down in Article 9 (1)-(3) must in addition provide adequate and effective remedies, 
including injunctive relief as appropriate, and be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive. 
Decisions must be given or recorded in writing and decisions of courts, and whenever possible of other bodies, 
shall be publicly accessible. 
 
14
 Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decisions-making and access to 
justice in environmental matters OJ L 124, 17.5.2005, p 13 
15
  Case T-264/04 WWF European Policy Programme v Council  [2007] ECR II-911 at paragraph  72  
16
 Also soŵetiŵes ƌefeƌƌed to as the ͚OpeŶŶess ‘egulatioŶ͛ 
17
 The purpose of the ATD was to give effect to the right of public access to documents and the limits of such 
access in accordance with Article 255 (2) EC Treaty, which only applied only to the documents of the Council, 
Commission and Parliament.  
18
 Decision 93/731 of the Council, Decision 94/90 of the Commission, Decision 97/632 of the European 
Parliament. 
19
 Eeckhout  P EU External Relations Law, 2nd ed, Oxford EU Law Library, Oxford University Press, 2011 at p 
327 
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concluded by the EU are implemented into Union law by means of secondary legislation. Moreover, 
whatever the position regarding transposition it is nevertheless incumbent on the institutions of the 
European Union (and its agencies and bodies) to ensure compliance with the obligations arising 
under the agreement once it is concluded.
20
   In order to align existing EU law with the requirements 
of the Convention the EU adopted the Aarhus Regulation in September 2006. 
21
 Before considering 
whether the combined provisions of the existing ATD Regulation and Aarhus Regulation comply with 
the requirements of the Convention it is worth reflecting that the Member States were required to 
transpose the provisions of the Environmental Information Directive into national law by 14 
February 2005. 
22
 The purpose of the Directive was to ensure consistency of national law with the 
Convention.  The delayed transposition of the Directive, on the part of five Member States, gave rise 
to infraction proceedings by the Commission.  In relation to Germany, Greece and Spain the cases 
were closed after these States had transposed the Directives.  
23
 In two cases the Court of Justice 
ruled that by not adopting, within the prescribed period, all the laws regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary to transpose the Directive Austria and Ireland had failed to fulfil their 
obligations under the Directive. 
24
  The Aarhus Regulation did not apply until 28 June 2007, some two 
years after the conclusion of the Convention.  
In deciding how to implement the provisions of the first pillar of the Convention, one option was to 
adopt a specific legal instrument that would govern the rights of access to environmental 
information and provide the remedies required by Articles 4, 5 and 9(1) of the Convention. This 
would have been consistent with the approach adopted in Directive 2003/4/EC. However,  the 
UŶioŶ͛s pƌefeƌƌed ĐhoiĐe ǁas to adopt aŶ iŶstƌuŵeŶt that ǁould deal ǁith all thƌee pillaƌs of the 
Convention in one piece of legislation, oŶ the ďasis that suĐh aŶ appƌoaĐh ǁould ͚ĐoŶtƌiďute to 
rationalising legislation and increasing transparency of the implementation measures taken with 
ƌegaƌd  to [UŶioŶ] iŶstitutioŶs aŶd ďodies͛. 25 Consequently the Aaƌhus ‘egulatioŶ ͚ďuilds upoŶ͛ the 
ATD Regulation. It does this through the use of a somewhat cumbersome statutory device by which 
͞‘egulatioŶ ϭϬϰϵ/ϮϬϬϭ shall applǇ to aŶǇ ƌeƋuest ďǇ aŶ appliĐaŶt foƌ eŶǀironmental information 
held by  [Union] institutions aŶd ďodies͟. 26  The CoŵŵissioŶ͛s ĐoŶĐlusioŶ is that the two regulations 
co-exist, but are largely convergent and coherent. 
27
  However it is arguable that the resulting dual 
track legislation is confusing to the ordinary citizen. It is settled law that where Member States are 
uŶdeƌ aŶ oďligatioŶ to iŵpleŵeŶt diƌeĐtiǀes  ͞the legal positioŶ uŶdeƌ ŶatioŶal laǁ should ďe 
suffiĐieŶtlǇ pƌeĐise aŶd Đleaƌ aŶd that iŶdiǀiduals aƌe ŵade fullǇ aǁaƌe of theiƌ ƌights͟, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ 
where the directive is intended to accord rights. 
28
 It is difficult to see why the EU legislation should 
escape such a basic requirement.  
                                                          
20
  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz  v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie . KG  a A. [1982] ECR 3641  at 11 
21
 See note  6  
22
 Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to 
environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC OJ L 41/26  14.2.2003 
23
 Cases C-44/07, C-85/06 and C-53/06 against Germany, Greece and Spain respectively. 
24
 Case C-340/06 Commission v Austria [2007] ECR and Case C-391/06 Commission v Ireland [2007] ECR I-65 
25
 Aarhus Regulation, Recital 5 
26
 Aarhus Regulation, Article 4  
27
 See Commission Green paper –Public Access to Documents held by Institutions of the European Community: 
A Review, COM 2007/0185 final at Section 6  
28
 See for example, Case C-365/93 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I -499; Case C -96/95 Commission v 
Germany [1997] ECR I 1653  
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The Aarhus Regulation seeks to address those Convention provisions that are not, in whole or in 
part, to be found in the ATD Regulation. 
29
  It aims to align the ATD Regulation with the Convention 
but only in relation to environmental information; the integrity of the ATD Regulation remains in 
relation to information that does not fall within the definition of environmental information.
30
 The 
Aarhus Regulation succeeds in this objective on a number of counts. First, Article 3 extends the 
application of the ATD Regulation to all of the UŶioŶ͛s iŶstitutioŶs, ageŶĐies aŶd ďodies 31 even to 
the extent that it applies to institutions and bodies acting in a legislative capacity, albeit these may 
be excluded under the Aarhus Convention. 
32
  Institutions and bodies acting in a judicial capacity are 
not included. The Aarhus Regulation also addresses the beneficiary limitations of Article 2 of the ATD 
Regulation by extending the right of access to environmental information to any natural or legal 
person without discrimination on the grounds of citizenship, nationality, domicile or registered 
seat.
33
   Further, Articles 4 and 5 of the Aarhus Regulation  impose duties oŶ the UŶioŶ͛s iŶstitutioŶs 
and bodies to collect and disseminate environmental information and to ensure its quality (that it is 
up to date, accurate and comparable), in  accordance with Article 5 of the Convention.  A 
consideration of the extent to whiĐh the EU Đoŵplies ǁith this ͚pƌogƌessiǀe disseŵiŶatioŶ͛ aspeĐt of 
the Convention is outside the scope of this paper.  However, it almost goes without saying that the 
more information that is made readily and easily accessible to the public should significantly reduce 
the number of requests for information.  Despite the huge volume of information that is accessible 
on line via the various institutional sites and Eurlex, and Prelex, requests for documents information 
continue to form a significant part of the information rights landscape of the EU. 
34
 This may be 
because the information sought is difficult to find. But it is more likely to be because the information 
has been withheld from the public. The Aarhus Convention does not require Parties to actively 
disseminate environmental information which it might otherwise refuse to disclose under one of the 
Convention exceptions to disclosure. 
35
 The focus of the remaining discussion is therefore on the 
extent to ǁhiĐh the eǆĐeptioŶs to disĐlosuƌe iŶ the EU͛s ATD aŶd Aaƌhus ‘egulatioŶs aƌe Đoŵpatiďle 
with the grounds for refusal permitted by the Convention.  It is accepted that the issue of 
compliance does not revolve entirely around the exceptions. There are, without doubt, real 
questions about the extent to which the institutions are complying, in practice, with the time limits 
for dealing with requests both at the application and confirmatory application stages. There are also 
other issues which brevity does not permit any further examination of. For example, the distinction 
between the right of access to documents (under the EU regulations) as opposed to information 
under the Convention; the rights of Member States to request that a document originating from a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
29
 Aarhus Regulation ,Recital 13 
30
 The definition of environmental information is provided in Article 2 (d) Aarhus Regulation and conforms to 
the corresponding definition in Article 2 Aarhus Convention.  
31
  ͞aŶǇ puďliĐ iŶstitutioŶ, ďodǇ, offiĐe oƌ ageŶĐǇ estaďlished ďǇ, oƌ oŶ the ďasis of, the TƌeatǇ͟. AƌtiĐle Ϯ ;ϭͿ ;ĐͿ 
Aarhus Regulation 
32
 Aarhus Regulation, Recital 7   
33
 Article 3 Aarhus Regulation.  
34
 In 2011 there were 6447 applications for documents. See Report from the Commission on the application in 
2011 of Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents. COM 2012/ 0429 final. 
35
 Aarhus Convention, Article 5 (10) 
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Member State should not be disclosed; 
36
  the duty to give reasons for non- disclosure and to 
consider the possibility of partial disclosure; and the procedural treatment of sensitive documents. 
37
  
 
The exceptions to disclosure  
Compliance difficulties arise in relation to the exceptions to disclosure because the Aarhus 
Regulation failed to address all of the differences between the ATD Regulation and the Convention 
and therefore failed to achieve symmetry with the Convention.  Moreover the structure of the 
legislation lacks coherence and clarity.  
Recital 15 Aarhus Regulation states that where the ATD Regulation ͞provides for exceptions, these 
should apply subject to aŶǇ ŵoƌe speĐifiĐ pƌoǀisioŶs͟ of the Aaƌhus ‘egulatioŶ where the request 
concerns environmental information.  The General Court, reading Recital 15 in conjunction with 
Articles 3 and 6 of the Aarhus Regulation, described the latter regulation as a lex specialis in relation 
to the ATD ‘egulatioŶ, ďǇ ͚ƌeplaĐiŶg, aŵeŶdiŶg oƌ ĐlaƌifǇiŶg ĐeƌtaiŶ pƌoǀisioŶs͛ of the ATD 
Regulation.
38
  The net practical effect of this  is that it is necessary to read across both Article 4 of 
the ATD Regulation and Articles 3 and  6 of the Aarhus Regulation in order to get a complete picture 
of the exceptions to disclosure, as they relate to environmental information.  Even if the combined 
provisions truly align themselves with the Convention it has to be questioned whether this rather 
complex statutory manoeuvre satisfies Article 3 of the Convention which requires the Parties  to 
provide a clear, transparent and consistent framework of implementing measures, which assist the 
public in understanding the nature and scope of their rights.  
39
 In comparison the Environmental 
Information Directive 2003/4/EC follows the structure and the wording of the Convention very 
closely, as do for example, the implementing measures in England and Wales. 
40
  In order to achieve 
the desired clarity there are strong arguments that the EU should have adopted a similar approach 
and legislated  a standalone regulation relating to access to environmental information which in turn 
would  clearly enumerate the exceptions to disclosure in line with the Convention. Since this is not 
the case the question is whether the combined provisions of the ATD and Aarhus Regulations 
comply with the Convention. The aŶsǁeƌ is theǇ doŶ͛t, Ŷot just ďeĐause of the ĐoŶǀoluted stƌuĐtuƌe 
but also because of  a number of significant textual differences.   
The grounds for refusal listed in Article 4 (3) of the Convention fall into three types; procedural, class 
based and where disclosure would adversely affect one of the listed protected interests. Significantly 
all are subject to the requirement that they be interpreted ͞iŶ a ƌestƌiĐtiǀe ǁaǇ taking into account 
                                                          
36
 ATD Regulation, Article 4 (5). However in Case C64/05 Sweden v Commission [2007] ECR I-11389 
the ECJ  held this does not constitute a right of veto  
37
 ATD Regulation, Article 9  
38
 Case T-29/08 Liga para Protecção da Natureza (LPN) v European Commission [2011] ECR II-06021 at 105. This 
case is subject to a pending appeal in Case C-605/11P 
39
 Note 2 , Aarhus Convention- Article 3 (1) Each Party shall take the necessary legislative, regulatory and other 
measures, including measures to achieve compatibility between the provisions implementing the information, 
public participation and access-to-justice provisions in this Convention, as well as proper enforcement 
measures, to establish and maintain a clear, transparent and consistent framework to implement the 
provisions of this Convention. 
 
40
 The Environmental Information Regulations 2004 SI No.  2004/3391 
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the public interest served by disclosure and taking into account whether the information requested 
relates to emissions͟.41  The Aarhus Regulation (Article 6 (1))seeks to incorporate this requirement 
into the ATD Regulation, which lists the exceptions to disclosure in Articles 4 (1) and (2).  Somewhat  
unfortunately a literal reading of the second sentence of Article 6 (1) suggests that the requirement 
to iŶteƌpƌet ƌestƌiĐtiǀelǇ oŶlǇ applies to ͚the otheƌ eǆĐeptioŶs͛ set out iŶ AƌtiĐle ϰ (i.e. only to the 
Article 4(1) exceptions and the second indent of Article  4(2)).  However, the General Court in Case T 
29/08 LPN v Commission has confirmed that  the duty of restrictive interpretation applies to all the 
exceptions,  consistent with the general principle  that any exception to an individual right, including 
the right of access to documents, must be applied and interpreted in a restrictive way.  
42
 
 
The Convention includes two safeguards that help the Parties understand what is meant by 
͚ƌestƌiĐtiǀe͛; the fiƌst is that iŶ all iŶstaŶĐes the puďliĐ authoƌitǇ ŵust take iŶto aĐĐouŶt the puďliĐ 
interest in disclosure. 
43
  This requires public authorities to ͞ǁeigh the puďliĐ iŶteƌest seƌǀed ďǇ 
disclosure against an interest protected by one of the exceptions.͟ 44 Since the Convention leaves no 
room for absolute exceptions it was necessary for the Aarhus Regulation to clarify that the 
exceptions listed in Article 4 (1) of the ATD Regulation are now all subject to the public interest test 
test. 
45
  (The exceptions in Article 4 (2) ATD were already subject the public interest test).  Neither 
the ATD or Aarhus Regulation define a procedure to examine grounds for ͚ǁeighiŶg͛ the puďliĐ 
interest served by disclosure against the interest served by the grounds for refusal, although the 
Court of Justice has ruled (in the context of the Environmental Information Directive) that a public 
authority may take into account cumulatively a number of the grounds for refusal and is not 
compelled to weigh each individually against the public interest.
46
  When an institution decides to 
refuse access to a document it must  first explain how access to that document could specifically and 
effectively undermine the public interest protected by an exception laid down in Article 4. The risk 
must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical. 
47
 It is in principle, open to the 
institution to base its decisions in that regard on general presumptions which apply to certain 
categories of documents, as considerations of a generally similar kind are likely to apply to requests 
for disclosure relating to documents of the same nature. However, it is incumbent on the institution 
to establish in each case whether the general considerations normally applicable to a particular type 
of document are in fact applicable to a specific document which it has been asked to disclose.
48
 In 
addition the institution must explain how the public interest vested in the exception overrides the 
public interest in disclosure. It is apparent that the institutions enjoy a wide discretion when 
considering whether access to a document(s) may undermine a public interest. This clearly limits the 
Couƌt͛s ĐapaĐitǇ to verifying whether the procedural rules and the duty to state reasons have been 
                                                          
41
 Aarhus Convention, Article 4 (4) 
42
 Note 36 at para 107 
43
 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide 2013  (2
nd
 edition). Edited by Ebbesson J., Gaugitsch H., 
JeŶdƌośka J., “teĐ “., aŶd Maƌshall F. At p ϴ6  
44
 Although the exception on the grounds that information is not held under Article 4 (3) (a) of the Convention 
is ďǇ its ǀeƌǇ Ŷatuƌe Ŷot aŵeŶaďle to suĐh a ďalaŶĐiŶg eǆeƌĐise. “ee AdǀoĐate GeŶeƌal Kokott͛͛ OpiŶioŶ iŶ Case 
C-71/10 Office of Communications v Information Commissioner  10 . 3. 2011  
45
Aarhus Regulation,  Article 4 (1)  
46
 Case C-71/10 Office of Communications v Information Commissioner [2011] ECR I-7205 
47
 Case T-211/00 Kuijer v Council [2002] ECR II-485 
48
 See Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco v Council [2008] ECR I-4723, paragraphs 44-45; 
and also Case T-121/05 Borax Europe Ltd. Commission [2009] ECR II-27 
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complied with; the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been a manifest error 
of assessment of the facts or misuse of power. 
49
 Once again by way of contrast the English 
Information Commissioner has the power (as does the Information Rights Tribunal) to reach a 
decision on where the public interest lies. 
50
 
 
The second safeguard requires public authorities to take into account whether the information 
requested relates to emissions into the environment in relation to all of the exceptions listed. 
51
  
Although the Convention clearly places a high priority on the disclosure of information on emissions 
it doesŶ͛t aĐtuallǇ aĐĐoƌd iŶfoƌŵatioŶ oŶ eŵissioŶs the status of aŶ ͚oǀeƌƌide͛ saǀe iŶ ƌelatioŶ to the 
commercial confidentiality exception. 
52
 Because the ATD Regulation makes no reference to 
information on emissions amendment was necessary, but in making this amendment the EU went 
somewhat further than was required by the Convention.  By the first sentence of  Article 6(1) Aarhus 
‘egulatioŶ ͞aŶ oǀeƌƌidiŶg puďliĐ iŶteƌest iŶ disĐlosuƌe shall ďe deemed to exist where the 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ƌelates to eŵissioŶs͟ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to Ŷot oŶlǇ the ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ĐoŶfideŶtialitǇ eǆĐeptioŶ, 
but also in relation to the exception relating to intellectual property,  the purpose of inspections and 
audits (but not investigations).  The effect of this is that in relation to those exceptions, Article 6 (1) 
lays down a presumption of law that an overriding public interest in disclosure exists where the 
requested information relates to emissions  into the environment. Consequently there is no need to 
balance the competing public interests in disclosure. This presumption does not apply to documents 
relating to investigations (and in particular those concerning possible infringements of EU law) and 
the other exceptions listed in Article 4 (1) ATD Regulation, but it is still necessary to take into account 
whether the information requested relates to emissions into the environment. 
53
 
 
Although AƌtiĐle 6 ;ϭͿ Aaƌhus ‘egulatioŶ iŵpoƌts these ͚general͛ requirements into Articles  4 (1) and 
(2)  of the ATD Regulation and Article 6 (2) adds the environmental protection exception (more of 
which later) the Aarhus Regulation fails to fully align the grounds for refusal with those listed in the 
Convention.  Accepting that there is no requirement for the EU legislation to adhere verbatim to the 
Convention there must be substantive compliance. Moreover, the Convention lays down minimum 
guarantees which, whilst they do not affect the right of a Party to maintain or introduce a broader 
access to information regime, prevent the Parties from adding any additional exceptions other than 
those listed in Article 4 of the Convention. A Member State would be exceeding its discretion and in 
breach of its obligations under the Treaties were it to include exceptions not contained in the 
                                                          
49
 See Case T-211/00 Kuijer v Council (Note 45) at paragraph 53 and also Case T-264/04 WWF European Policy 
Programme v Council [2007] ECR II-911 
50
 See for example ????? 
51
 Note 36 at page 86 
52
 Aarhus Convention (note 2), Article 4 (4) (a) Information on emissions which is relevant for the protection of 
the environment shall be disclosed.  
53
 Foƌ fuƌtheƌ disĐussioŶ of the ͚eŵissioŶs͛ oǀeƌƌide aŶd defiŶitioŶ of eŵissioŶs see AdǀoĐate GeŶeƌal Kokotts͛s 
Opinion in Case C-266/09 Stichting Natuur en Milieu Vereniging Milieudefensie Vereniging Goede Waar & Co. v 
College voor de toelating van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden [2010] ECR I 13119 
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Environmental Information Directive.
54
   However despite the fact that the first three indents in 
Article 4(1)(a) ATD Regulation broadly correspond 
55
 with Article 4 (4) of the Convention, the Aarhus 
Regulation  failed to remove the fourth indent relating to the ͞public interest in the financial, 
monetary or economic policy on the part of the Parties͟.  This is not one of the listed Convention 
exceptions and, whilst in practice it does not appear to be widely utilized
56
 its inclusion constitutes a 
clear breach of the Convention.   
 
The exceptions listed in Article 4(2) of the ATD Regulation are also problematical. First, the 
commercial confidentiality exception (in the first indent) applies if disclosure would undermine the 
protection of the commercial interests of a natural or legal person (including intellectual property). 
However the Convention (and the Environmental Information Directive) requires that such 
ĐoŶfideŶtialitǇ ŵust ďe ͚pƌoteĐted ďǇ laǁ iŶ oƌdeƌ to pƌoteĐt a legitiŵate eĐoŶoŵiĐ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ.͛57 The 
omission in the ATD Regulation could be significant. For example in the UK the First Tier (Information 
Rights) Tribunal has held in a number of  Đases held that it isŶ͛t suffiĐieŶt that iŶfoƌŵatioŶ is Đlaiŵed 
to be confidential, the confidentiality must be protected by law (either by statute, contract of the 
common law duty of confidence.)
58
 Consequently the exception in the ATD Regulation is more 
expansive than the Convention and capable of protecting more information than is intended by the 
Convention.  Given that this exception is increasingly being invoked by the institutions this is a 
particular cause for concern.
59
  Second,  the second and third indents of Article 4 (2) state that an 
institution shall refuse to disclose a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of 
court proceedings and legal advice (second indent) and the purpose of inspections, investigations 
and audits (third indent). These are not delimited in any way. The corresponding Convention 
eǆĐeptioŶ pƌoteĐts the ͚Đouƌse of justiĐe, the aďilitǇ of a peƌsoŶ to ƌeĐeiǀe a faiƌ tƌial oƌ the aďilitǇ of 
a public authority to conduct an enquiry of a criminal or disciplinary nature͛.  Although the 
exceptions are worded differently they appear to be protecting the same interests, that is with the 
exception of audits. It is difficult to see how an audit, particularly where it concerns expenditure of 
public monies fits with this Convention exception.  
 
 
Internal communications 
Further differences arise in relation to the ͚internal communications͛ exception provided by the 
Convention.  Coppel claims that in the absence of an immediately obvious, universal public interest 
                                                          
54
 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the experience gained in the 
application of Directive 2003/4/EC on Public access to Environmental Information, COM 2012 774 final, at  p 7  
55
 Article 4 (1) ATD Regulation lists defence and military matters in the second indent whereas the Convention 
refers only to national defence 
56
 In 2012 only 1.4% of applications were refused on the basis of this exception. See note 52 at Annex 1.  
57
 The Directive, at Article 4 (2) (d) refers to the confidentiality of commercial or industrial information where 
such confidentiality is provided for by national or Community law. See also Case C -204/09 Flachglas Torgau 
GmbH v Federal Republic of Germany(not yet published)  at paragraph 61 
 
58
 Jones v Information Commissioner & Environment Agency EA/2011/0157 27.04.2012; South Gloucestershire 
CC v Information Commissioner & Bovis Homes EA/2007/0032  20.10.2009 
59
 The protection of commercial interests was invoked in 16.83% of cases in 2011 compared with 11.84% in 
2010. See note 32 
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in maintaining aŶ eǆĐeptioŶ that eŶtitles ƌefusal oŶ the ďasis that ͚the ƌeƋuest iŶǀolǀes the 
disclosure of internal communications͛  it is necessary to unpick the objectives underlying  the 
exception.
60
 The Aarhus Implementation Guide  suggests that it may be intended to protect the 
personal  opinions of government staff but cautions that opinions or statements expressed by public 
authorities acting as statutory consultees as part of a decision making process cannot be considered 
internal communications, neither can factual  material or studies commissioned by public authorities 
from related but independent bodies. 
61
 The underlying rationale for this exception therefore lies in 
the notion of providing private space for officials to express views and opinions at the early stages of 
decision making.   Unlike the Directive, which verbatim transposes this exception, the corresponding 
provision in the ATD Regulation is Article 4 (3).This provides that access to a document drawn up by 
an institution for internal use (or received by an institution) which relates to a matter where the 
decision has not been taken by the institution shall be refused if disclosure would seriously 
uŶdeƌŵiŶe the iŶstitutioŶ͛s deĐisioŶ ŵakiŶg process, unless there is an overriding public interest in 
disclosure.  The second paragraph relates to documents containing opinions for internal use as part 
of deliberations and preliminary consultations and states that an institution shall refuse to disclose 
these even after the decision has been taken if disclosure of the document would seriously 
undermine the institutions decision making process.  On the one hand the wording of Article 4 (3) 
results in narrower exception because it incorporates an adverse effect threshold which is not 
required by the Convention. The threshold is set quite high with the requirement that disclosure 
would seriously undermine the decision making process.   If disclosure would not have this effect the 
information must be disclosed and even if disclosure would have this effect the institution must 
disclosure if there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. On the other hand the first paragraph 
of Article 4 (3) also extends the protection to information received by an institution. It is difficult to 
see how this might be justified under any of the Convention exceptions except perhaps the interests 
of a third party who has supplied the information voluntarily.
62
  
The inclusion of the environmental protection exception contained in Article 4(4)(h) of the 
Convention was absolutely essential and this has been achieved by Article 6 (2) Aarhus Regulation.  
The addition is almost verbatim the Convention and as such is the most closely aligned of all the 
exceptions, particularly since it provides that an institution  ͚ŵaǇ͛ ƌefuse aĐĐess to eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ǁheƌe disĐlosuƌe ǁould ͚adǀeƌselǇ affeĐt͛ the pƌoteĐtioŶ of the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt to ǁhiĐh 
the information relates.  This highlights another substantive difference between the ATD Regulation 
and the Convention in that all of the exceptions (except the environmental protection exception) are 
expressed in mandatory terms; aŶ iŶstitutioŶ ͚shall͛ refuse to disclose if the conditions of the 
exception are engaged. In short the institutions appear only to have discretion in deciding whether a 
protected interest is undermined, whether the information relates to emissions and whether there is 
an overriding public interest in disclosure.  If the exception is engaged they have no option but to 
refuse disclosure.  However, the AIG suggests that public authorities should have discretion  to 
decide whether to withhold information rather than being obliged to. This is certainly the case in the 
Environmental Information Regulations in England &Wales. The point may be moot in that it is 
unlikely in practice that a public authority will disclose information if all the elements of the 
                                                          
60
 Coppel P Information Rights Law & Practice , 2010  (3
rd
 edition) Hart Publishing,  at page 207 
61
 See note 41, at page 79 
62
 Aarhus Convention  (Note 2) Article 4 (4) (g) Where disclosure would adversely affect the interests of a third 
party which has supplied the information requested without that party being under or capable of being under 
a legal obligation to do so, and where that party does not consent to the release of the material.  
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exception are engaged. Nevertheless it is arguable that the lack of discretion on the part of the EU 
institutions potentially breaches the Convention.  
 
In respect of the exceptions, the ATD Regulation includes two important provisions relating 
to consultation with third parties and Member States, which were not altered by the Aarhus 
Regulation but are not in themselves contrary to the Convention.  
63
  Consultation with third 
paƌties ƌelatiŶg to the disĐlosuƌe of the thiƌd paƌtǇ͛s doĐuŵeŶt;sͿ ŵaǇ iŶ faĐt ďe good 
practice particularly if there are considerations relating to the disclosure of confidential 
business information or information protected by intellectual property rights. However the 
ATD Regulation doesŶ͛t iŵpose aŶǇ tiŵe fƌaŵes foƌ suĐh ĐoŶsultatioŶ aŶd theƌefoƌe aŶǇ 
delays during the consultation process may delay a decision on disclosure. Consultation with 
Member States (under Article 4 (3)) re disclosure of documents originating from the Member 
State has been problematical but the Court of Justice has ruled that this does not give 
Member States a right of veto on disclosure and where Member States object to disclosure 
they must cite exceptions in the Regulation. 
64
 Although this doesŶ͛t Đause aŶǇ direct 
Convention compliance issues in practice consultation with Member States may be 
protracted and cause delays in providing decisions to applicants within the prescribed time 
frames.  
 
Challenging refusal decisions  
The Aarhus Convention requires that requests for environmental information are responded to as 
soon as possible and at the latest within one month after the request has been submitted. The 
ATD Regulation  imposes a much stricter deadline of only  15 working days for the institution  to 
either or  give a written reply  explaining the reasons for non or partial disclosure. This deadline 
can only be extended in exceptional circumstances when the request is for very long or large 
number of documents; and then only to allow an extension of 15 days. Failure by by the 
institution to reply within the prescribed time-limit entitles the applicant to make a confirmatory 
application. Confirmatory applications are also to be handled promptly and within 15 days the 
institution is required to either grant access of provide a written explanation of why they are 
confirming their decision.  Further to this a dissatisfied applicant has the right to institute court 
proceedings before the General Court (under Article 263 TFEU) or complain to the Ombudsman.  
On paper this raises no Convention compliance issues.  However, even a cursory examination of 
the cases before the General Court and Ombudsman reports shows that applicants often 
experience significant delays and that the Institutions are not always working within these 
timeframes.
 65
  In particular, difficulties arise where the institution fails to reach an express 
decision on a confirmatory application within the prescribed period.  Although this constitutes an 
implied negative decision
66
 which is amenable to judicial review, a challenge to an implied 
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 ATD Regulation, Articles 4 (4) and 4 (5) 
64
 Case C64/05 Sweden v Commission [2007] ECR I-11389 
65
See for example,  http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/decision.faces/en/5515/html.bookmark, 
accessed at 23
rd
 January 2013 
66
 ATD Regulation, By Article 8 (1) - failure to reply to a confirmatory application within the prescribed period 
shall be considered a negative reply and entitle the applicant to institute court proceedings and/or complain to 
the Ombudsman. 
12 
 
decision may lose its purpose and be inadmissible if the institution subsequently issues a delayed 
express decision. 
67
  In the ClientEarth T&E  case
68
 the General Court was not prepared to 
adjudicate on an earlier implied negative decision because the Commission had, some six months 
later issued an express decision on the basis that the review should have been against the later 
express decision.  Such a stance is regrettable because effectively leaves the institutions beyond 
judicial reproach or sanction where they fail to meet deadlines , does nothing to deter future 
unlawfulness and may  result in damage by making it impossible to for the applicants to 
participate in the decision making process.   This also creates legal uncertainty for applicants as to 
when to commence judicial review proceedings and consequently claims may be struck out as 
inadmissible for failure to lodge a case within the time limit. 
 
Breach of the Convention as a ground for review 
A challenge to a decision must be based on an argument that the contested measure breaches, inter 
alia, the Treaties or any rule of law relating to their application. Whilst this clearly allows applicants 
to challenge refusal decisions addressed to them on the basis that they breach the provisions of the 
ATD/Aarhus Regulations the question is whether applicants may rely directly on the provisions of the 
Convention. In a number of relatively recent cases currently pending before the General Court 
applicants have sought to do this. 
69
 In particular in Case  T-545/11 Stichting Greenpeace Nederland 
and PAN Europe v Commission the appliĐaŶts aƌgue that CoŵŵissioŶ͛s deĐisioŶ Ŷot to alloǁ 
disclosure of certain information is not in accordance with Article 4 of the Aarhus Convention. 
70
 It 
must be recalled that an agreement, such as the Convention, concluded by the Council is binding on 
the UŶioŶ͛s iŶstitutioŶs aŶd the Meŵďeƌ “tates. 71 It is also settled law that such an agreement 
foƌŵs aŶ iŶtegƌal paƌt of the EU͛s legal oƌdeƌ aŶd the Court of Justice ensure compliance with it. 72  
However, the question of whether an individual may rely directly on the provisions of such an 
agreement to assert a right must be determined in the light of the wording, purpose and nature of 
the agreement. The provisions of the agreement must contain a clear and precise obligation which is 
not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure. 
73
 The 
difficulty here is that Article 4 of the Convention specifically confers on public authorities (including 
the EU institutions) discretion regarding the application of the exceptions to disclosure.  This was 
one of the problems in the so called Brown Bears case where the Court of Justice held that Article 9 
                                                          
67
 See for example,  Case T-449/10, ClientEarth, European Federation for Transport and Environment (T&E), 
European Environmental Bureau (EEB),  and Case T 56/13  ClientEarth and Stichting BirdLife Europe v European 
Commission. (not yet published) 
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 Ibid, at paragraphs 41-42  
69
 See Cases T 111/11 ClientEarth v Commission; T-214/11 ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA; T-245/11 
ClientEarth and International Chemical Secretariat v ECHA (not yet published) 
70
 Case T545/11 Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and PAN Europe v Commission  
71
 Article 216 (2)  TFEU 
72
 Case 181/73, Haegeman [1974 ECR 449, paragraph 5;Case 104/81 Kupferberg[1982] ECR 3641  ; Case 12/86, 
Demirel [1987] 3719, paragraph 7. Case C -431/05 Merck Genéricos- Productos Farmacêuticos Lda/ Merck Co. 
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(3) of the Convention was not capable of direct effect because it envisaged the adoption of further 
measures at the national level to determine which members of the public are deemed to have 
standing. The Court also concluded that Art 9(3) of the Convention lacked the requisite clarity and 
precision. 
74
  It remains to be seen whether Article 4 of the Convention is capable of direct effect but 
given the broad discretion that public authorities have in reaching access decisions it seems unlikely 
that the Court will conclude that it is. If the arguments about direct effect fail then the Court will be 
forced to consider the alternative argument advanced in the Stichting Greenpeace namely that it 
interprets the provisions of Article 4 of the ATD Regulation in the most Convention compliant way 
possible. 
 
The plea of illegality  
Article 277 TFEU allows any party to annulment proceedings to challenge, indirectly, the validity of 
earlier measures (including Regulations) which constitute the legal basis for the decision at issue.    It 
is settled law that if there is a conflict between an EU regulation or directive and an international 
agreement, the Union or Member States would have to apply the provisions of the agreement and 
derogate from the EU secondary law provision. 
75
 This precedence also has the effect of requiring EU 
law texts to be interpreted in accordance with such agreements. 
76
 Accordingly the validity of the 
Aarhus Regulation may be affected if it is incompatible with the Convention.   In two cases decided 
on the same day the General Court was prepared to review the legality of Article 10(1) of the Aarhus 
Regulation in the light of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. 
77
 Although neither case concerned 
access to documents their relevance is clear. The position regarding the invocation of international 
agreements to challenge the legality of EU measures is briefly rehearsed by the General Court in 
both cases.  According to the case law the EU judicature may examine the validity of an EU 
regulation in the light of an international treaty where two conditions are satisfied; the nature and 
broad logic of the international agreement must not preclude this and in addition, the provisions of 
the Treaty/Convention must appear, as regards their content, to be unconditional and sufficiently 
precise. 
78
 However, the Court in reliance on, inter alia, Case 70/87 Fediol
79
 and Case C-69/89 
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Nakajima
80
 ĐoŶsideƌed that it ǁasŶ͛t necessary to satisfy the direct effect condition where the EU 
has intended to implement a particular obligation assumed under an international agreement, or 
where the measure makes an express renvoi to particular provisions of that agreement. 
81
 On the 
substantive issue the Court, in both cases, found that Article 10 (1) of the Aarhus Regulation, which 
liŵits the ĐoŶĐept of ͚aĐts͛ iŶ AƌtiĐle ϵ ;ϯͿ of the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ to ͚adŵiŶistƌatiǀe aĐts͛ (defined  as 
͚ŵeasuƌe[s] of iŶdiǀidual sĐope͛Ϳ is not compatible with Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.  Both 
cases have been appealed; first on the ground that the Court erred in finding it could review the 
legality of the Aarhus Regulation and secondly that the legislative choices made by the legislature 
are consistent with the Convention and that the General Court had disregarded the discretion 
afforded to the contracting parties. 
82
   
 
The lack of an effective judicial remedy 
The most potent compliance issue arises in relation to the lack of an effective judicial remedy.  
Applicants may challenge the legality of a refusal decision before the General Court under the 
provisions of Article 263 TFEU, with a right of appeal on a point of law to the Court of Justice. 
83
  
However, the EU Courts can only annul a contested refusal decision;  critically neither the General 
Court nor ECJ has authority to order disclosure of documents. 
84
 Judicial review applications are only 
admissible in so far as they seek annulment of the contested decision and the Court will not instruct 
the institution to take any actioŶ to ͚ĐoƌƌeĐt͛ the situatioŶ.  85 It is for the institution concerned to 
adopt the measures necessary to implement a judgment given in proceedings for annulment.
86
  In 
the absence of any provisions within the Treaties requiring institutions to take the necessary 
ŵeasuƌes ͚eǆpeditiouslǇ͛   it is usuallǇ left foƌ the iŶstitutioŶs to aĐt ǁithiŶ a ƌeasoŶaďle tiŵe fƌaŵe. 
In the context of disclosure of information this inevitably means further delays for applicants who 
may require the contested information within a specific timeframe, particularly if it relates to a 
public participation exercise. It is therefore entirely arguable that the Article 263 judicial review 
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procedure fails to secure the adequate and effective remedy required by Article 9 (4) of the 
Convention.  By contrast in the UK the Information Commissioner has the power (subject to review 
by the Information Rights Tribunals and Upper Courts) to order disclosure of documents within a 
specified timeframe. 
87
    
Conclusion 
The Aarhus Regulation intended to align EU law with the provisions of the Aarhus Convention. 
Unfortunately in the absence of a distinct legal measure which deals exclusively with access to 
environmental information it is necessary to read across the combined provisions of the ATD and 
Aarhus Regulations to determine whether the EU achieved this objective. Not only is this 
unsatisfactory in terms of clarity, but the combined provisions do not completely align themselves 
with the Convention. In particular the grounds for refusing documents/information in the ATD 
Regulations are wider than those contained in the Convention and are couched in mandatory rather 
than discretionary terms.  It remains to be seen how the EU courts will respond to the cases that are 
now pending  which raise issues relating to the direct effect of the Convention and raise a plea of 
illegality in respect of the Aarhus Regulation. However the biggest compliance issue arises not in 
relation to differences in the provisions, but in the lack of an effective judicial remedy inherent in 
Article 263 TFEU. Moreover it would appear that the institutional practice of issuing delayed express 
decisions outside the prescribed time frames can devoid legal challenges of purpose, without any 
institutions incurring any sanction, other than an adverse award of costs.   
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Although the EU Courts have exercised their jurisdiction in cases relating to inter alia the 
interpretation and scope of the exceptions and the assessment of the public interest.
88
 
                                                          
88
 See for example, Cases C-39 & 52/05 Sweden and Turco v Council [2008] ECR I-4723 
